If
you are moving across state lines and using a moving company, you need to know
about the Carmack Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 14706). The Amendment will affect your ability to recover monetary
damages from the moving company should your goods be damaged in transit.
The
Amendment established uniform federal liability guidelines for interstate
carriers. In doing so, it made recovering
damages simpler because it made a carrier strictly liable up to the actual loss
or damage to the shipped goods.
The
Amendment, however, also provides some tangible benefits to the carriers.
1. It
preempts state common law claims against an interstate carrier related to shipped goods that are damaged or lost. See Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. of Tex. V.
Harris, 234 U.S. 412, 420 (1914). Certain jurisdictions have interpreted broadly Carmack preemption. See Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 777 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding common law claims of outrage, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract, breach of implied
or express warranty, violation of state consumer protection law,
slander, misrepresentation, fraud, negligence and gross negligence, and
violation of the common carrier's statutory duties as a common carrier
under state law preempted); Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding common law claims of negligence, breach of insurance contract, breach of contract of carriage, conversion, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress preempted). However, certain jurisdictions have held that some types of claims survive the Carmack Amendment's preemption. See Smith v. United Parcel Service, 296 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that "separate and distinct conduct rather than injury must exist for a claim" not to be preempted); Morris v. Covan Worldwide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that claims "separate and apart from those resulting directly from the loss of shipped property" would not be preempted); Gordon v. United Van Lines, 130 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not preempted); Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir. 1997) ("a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleges a harm to the shipper that is independent from the loss or damage to goods and, as such, would not be preempted").
2. It
allows a carrier to limit the amount of time for a filing a claim (49
U.S.C. § 14706(e)). A carrier may
require any claims be brought within nine months.
3. It
allows a carrier to limit the amount of the liability. To limit its liability, a carrier must
have offered the shipper a reasonable opportunity to choose between two or more
levels of liability. On moving
contracts, the choice typically appears between "full (replacement)
value", which costs additional money, or "waiver of full
(replacement) value protection", which is free but only provides
protection equal to 60 cents per pound.
Thus, under the latter choice, an audio component worth $500 and
weighing 20 pounds would be covered for $12.00.
Thus,
your choice as to the amount of liability protection is very important because,
if something should happen to your goods during the move, your ability to
recover damages will be limited by the Carmack Amendment.
- Henry Park
- Henry Park
[updated on January 30 and 31, 2015 to clarify scope of preemption]
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